This paper estimates the impact of loan officers' subjectivity on microcredit granting by exploiting an exceptionally detailed database from a Brazilian microfinance institution. Loan officers collect field data, meet with applicants, and make recommendations to the credit committee that in turn has the final say on both loan approval and loan size. The loan officers' subjectivity is captured through the lens of disparate treatment based on gender. Indeed, our estimations show that an unfair gender gap is observed in loan size, and that this gap is almost exclusively attributable to the loan officers. We interpret this finding as evidence that, despite monitoring and wage incentivization, microcredit officers keep letting their subjective preferences interfere with loan granting. We conclude by suggesting alternative means to curb subjectivity in credit allocation to micro-entrepreneurs. 
Introduction
Asymmetric information is the main problem faced by the lending industry (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) , including microcredit institutions (Karlan and Zinman, 2009 ). To tackle this problem, bankers typically combine two strategies: credit scoring and relationship lending. By the rst of these strategies, the lending institutions assess the creditworthiness of potential borrowers from their personal and/or business characteristics (Hand and Henley, 2007; Lewis, 1994) . The sound strategy is a time-consuming process by which credit ocers learn about their clients' creditworthiness (Berger and Udell, 1995; Boot, 2000) and oer them progressively increasing loans after timely repayments (Egli, 2004) .
For reasons likely pertaining to low technology and relatively cheap human capital, credit scoring plays a less prominent role in the microcredit industry than in mainstream banking.
1 As a consequence, credit ocers benet from more leeway to allocate loans (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010). 2 This paper oers the rst empirical estimation of the impact of loan ocers' subjectivity on microcredit granting. This is made possible by the access to an exceptionally detailed database from VivaCred, a Brazilian Micronance Institution (MFI).
The recent crisis in Andhra Pradesh has shown that microcredit ocers are hard to monitor, notably because the microlending methodology is highly decentralized (Fuentes, 1996; Warning and Sadoulet, 1998; Churchill, 1999; Aubert, de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2009; Dixon, Ritchie and Siwale, 2007) .
Moreover, demand for microcredit still by far exceeds supply(de Janvry, McIntosh and Sadoulet, 2010) . Consequently, when selecting borrowers the loan ocers could be tempted to follow their subjective preferences, rather the MFI's best interests.
3
1 See Tra and Lensink (2007) for a comparative discussion on the lending practices of formal and informal credit markets.
2 Moreover, Hartarska (2005) shows that, in Central and Eastern Europe, performancebased compensation is not necessarily associated with better-performing micronance institutions.
3 The MFI's best interests need not be restricted to prot maximization. For instance, Conning (1999) ; McIntosh and Wydick (2005) ; Ghosh and Van Tassel (2008) ; Armendáriz and Szafarz (2011) propose models built on socially-oriented objective functions.
2
On the other hand, most MFIs are socially-oriented and often subsidized institutions that have to stick to moral standards. Therefore, they need their sta to make decisions in line with both their mission statement and sustainability concern. As a matter of fact, monitoring credit ocers is a major but dicult task.
For the researcher, disentangling objective creditworthiness assessment and subjective -and hence possibly discriminatory -judgment from loan ocers requires observing the decision process that takes place within the MFI. More precisely, it is necessary to determine for each loan application: 1) how the ocer's recommendation is drawn from the applicant's characteristics, and 2) how the credit committee makes its nal decision.
The current paper addresses this issue through the lens of disparate treatment.
We demonstrate that in VivaCred, a Brazilian MFI, women entrepreneurs receive smaller loans than their male counterparts, all other things being equal. Building on these ndings, we dissect the underlying decision mechanism. Namely, we ascribe to both the loan ocers and the credit committee their own shares of responsibility in the loan-size gender gap.
Our estimation results show that the unfair gender gap in loan size is almost exclusively created by loan ocers. However, instead of correcting this bias the credit committee tends to reinforce it, albeit marginally.
These results are reached through partial-least-square (PLS) estimations that mimic the following three-step loan-allocation process: 1) applicant's request, 2) loan ocer's recommendation, and 3) credit committee's decision. Indeed, our database includes all applicants' personal and business objective characteristics. Moreover, it enables us to trace the treatment of any loan application that reaches the MFI. By taking into consideration all the screening variables collected by the MFI, our results suer as little as possible from the missing-variable problem that often plagues studies on creditworthiness assessment (Ross and Yinger, 2002 4 There is an additional one-shot registration fee (from 3 to 5%), depending of the credit duration and the client's repayment history.
The database includes all pieces of information gathered by the six branches of VivaCred. Hence, our study is based on exhaustive data concerning 34,000 applications and 32,000 actual loans.
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The loan ocers play a key role in clientele selection. Indeed, they are in charge of meeting with applicants, collecting all relevant pieces of information, and making proposals to the credit committee based on their own creditworthiness evaluation. The credit committee makes the nal decision.
In principle, the credit committee should monitor the loan ocers, but in practice this is little enforced.
However, loan ocers benet from wage incentives. Their wage is split in two parts: a xed basis and a performance-related premium, which depends positively on the number of new contracts they bring to the MFI and on their outstanding loan portfolio, and negatively on the proportion of their contracts with delays in payment longer than 30 days.
6
The full decision process taking place in VivaCred is summarized by gure 1.
This process starts when a loan application enters the MFI (step 1). The application les are entrusted with loan ocers on a geographic basis in order to reduce operational costs. The designated ocer meets with the applicant and guarantor, if any, collects the relevant data, and makes a recommendation to the credit committee (step 2). This second step is particularly demanding as the loan ocer is asked to go through the applicant's business balance sheet and household's budget in detail. Lastly, the full application le -including the ocer's recommendation -is examined by the credit committee, 7 which 4 This interest rate has to be understood in the Brazilian context. Over the period 1997-2007, the central bank key interest rate (celic) was between 0.89% and 2.58% a month (between 11.18% and 35.76% a year). During the same period, Banco da Mulher, a comparable non-prot institution, was oering rates between 3% and 5% a month, and Fininvest, a for-prot institution, was oering consumption loans with rates reaching 12% a month. Until 2009, VivaCred was funded by BNDES (Brazilian Bank of Development)
at an annual rate of 7.5% (this rate was even higher during the period 1997-2007). Later, VivaCred integrated the national program CrediAmigo nanced by Banco do Nordeste, a Brazilian public bank.
5 The contracts with incomplete specications, the loans to VivaCred's employees, and the few group loans were removed.
6 VivaCred considers loans as delayed after 30 days, and defaulted after 180 days.
7 Actually, the so-called credit committee refers to a single person who is either the 4 has the nal word on the loan approval/denial and size (step 3). The loan ocer has a face-to-face contact with each applicant, which is not the case for the credit committee. The ocer also spends more time on each individual le. For these reasons, it is likely that subjectivity directly aects the ocer's recommendation more than it aects the committee's decision.
Our dataset enables us to trace the progression of all applications, even those that are ultimately denied. Indeed, for each application we observe:
1) the applicant's requested amount, 2) the loan ocer's recommendation, and 3) the nal loan size xed by the credit committee. Table 1 presents the overall and gender-disaggregated descriptive statistics for these gures.
The nal loan size is expressed both in absolute terms and in proportion to the requested amount. For each variable, a t-test for equal means between genders is performed. In the next section, we draw regressions controlling for all known characteristics pertaining to the borrowers, their businesses and the loan specications.
The remaining gender gap, if any, will thus be unexplained by these objective characteristics. Isolating in this way the subjective component of the gender gap will subsequently lead to the determination each actor's share of responsibility.
Subjectivity and Gender Gap
After having dened their target population, MFIs typically delegate clientele selection to loan ocers, resulting in a potential agency problem (see Aubert, de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2009 ). Existing evidence points to a discrepancy between the goals of lenders and the behavior of their agents. In particular, loan ocers tend to favor applicants who meet their subjective preferences regarding some group membership. For instance, Storey (2004) shows that, in Trinidad and Tobago, applications from African small-business owners are more likely to be denied than others. In the same line, Labie et al. (2010) demonstrate that loan ocers are reluctant to serve disabled applicants.
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The disparate treatment of women entrepreneurs in loan granting is also widely documented in the literature (Blanchower, Levine and Zimmerman, 2003; Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo, 1998; Cavalluzzo and Wolken, 2005; Alesina, Lotti and Mistrulli, 2008) . Beyond higher probability of denial, This is all the more important because loan size is key to growth and survival of small business projects.
Also, unlike mortgage loan applications that are typically approved or denied as such, productive loans can be easily sized by the lender. Therefore, observing both the requested amounts and the corresponding loan sizes enables us to estimate the credit rationing endured by each segment of the population.
In VivaCred, the full gender gap in loan size is the sum of three components, each of which is taking place in a given step of the loan granting progress featured in Figure 1 . In step 1, an initial gender gap is created because female applicants ask for smaller loans, ceteris paribus. In step 2, loan ocers produce gender-biased recommendations. In step 3, the credit committee adds its nal touch to the gender gap. The initial gender gap relates to the applicant, and not to the MFI. Our analysis therefore concentrates on the remaining gender gap that is purely attributable to the MFI, leaving aside the issue raised by the gender-related requested amount.
9 Table 1 exhibits the gender gaps that appear in each step. However, descriptive statistics mix the impacts of the applicant's prole and the consequences from judgmental biases. Regressions are therefore required to disentangle the objective and subjective factors involved in the loan-size gender gap.
We use Partial-Least-Square (PLS) estimation to mimic the sequential process that governs loan granting.
First, applicant i announces requested amount RA i , then the credit ocer recommends to grant applicant i a loan of size P A i (possibly zero), and lastly the credit committee xes the real loan size, LS i (equal to zero if the loan is denied).
In line with the loan granting process, the PLS estimation rests upon a recursive specication. Firstly, we regress the requested amount on the gender dummy and the control variables:
where F is the gender dummy, Z summarizes the control variables, 10 and RRA is the residual requested amount, which is therefore the component of the requested amount that is explained by neither the applicant's gender, nor the control variables.
9 In the rst-best situation, the MFI should correct this original bias, and therefore apply milder credit rationing to female applicants.
10 Bold characters are used for vectors.
7
This rst regression is crucial because using RRA instead of RA in the sequel makes it possible to leave aside the initial gender gap attributable to the applicant.
Secondly, the loan size proposed by the loan ocer is regressed on the gender dummy, the controls, and the residual requested amount:
where RP A represents the residual proposed amount. This regression cleans the amount proposed by the loan ocer from the impacts of gender, requested amount, and controls.
Lastly, the nal loan size resulting from the credit committee's decision is explained by the gender dummy, the controls, the residual requested amount (from the applicant), and the residual proposed amount (from the loan ocer):
Eq.3 estimates the impacts on loan size of both the applicant's RRA and the ocer's RPA, independently from gender and controls. The remaining gender gap, if any, is then attributable to the credit committee. Indeed, eq.1 yields:
where
Similarly, thanks to eq.1 and eq.4 the nal loan size writes:
where:
The full gender gap in loan size, γ F , is split into four components, each one representing a specic channel through which the applicant's gender inuences the nal loan size. Indeed, when making its decision, the credit 8 committee takes into account the client's prole as well as the loan ocer's proposal. In turn, the loan ocer's proposal takes into account the applicant's prole. Therefore, in each step, a gender gap may be caused by both objective characteristics and subjective judgement.
Two components of the full gender-gap may be seen as objective because they derive from the fact that women ask for smaller loans than men, certeris paribus. Firstly, the impact of the requested amount channeled by the loan ocers is measured by coecient c P b R a F . Secondly, the impact of the requested amount channeled by the credit committee is measured by coecient c R a F . These two components are due to the initial gender gap in the requested amounts, independently from gender considerations.
The two other components represent subjective contributions to the gender gap in loan size. They are created by MFI's agents who allocate smaller loans to women with same characteristics than men (including the requested amount). Firstly, the contribution of gender-biased loan ocers is measured by coecient c P b F . Secondly, the contribution of the gender-biased credit committee is measured by coecient c F . Column (1), corresponding to eq. (1), conrms that the impact of gender on requested amount is signicantly negative. Column (2), corresponding to eq. (4) shows that the loan ocer's proposal depends negatively on gender and positively on the residual requested amount. From column (3), corresponding to eq. (7), it appears that the nal loan size (LS) is also impacted negatively by gender and positively by the residual requested amount. Moreover, as expected the nal loan size is positively linked to the residual proposed amount. Loans granted to women are on average BRL 94 lower than loans granted to men. The estimates presented in table 2 allow to decompose this dierence.
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On the objective side, the initial gender gap combines BRL 59.66 coming from the loan ocers and BRL 1.77 coming from the credit committee. On 11 From table 2 and equations (5), (10), and (8), we derive the following estimates:b F =−28.76,ĉ R = 0.0165, andĉ F =−6.99. These gures lead to the estimated products: c P b F = −25.57, c P b R a F = −59.66, and c R a F = −1.77.
the subjective side, additional gender gaps of BRL 25.57 and BRL 6.99 are created by biased loan ocers and credit committee, respectively.
This decomposition of the full gender gap in loan size is further detailed in table 3. The results (in %) are given for all applicants (rst column), the newcomers (second column), and the known clients 12 (third column), respectively. In the full sample, the main source of gender gap relates to female requesting lower amounts (65.3%). However, instead of correcting this initial gap unjustied by pure credit-scoring characteristics, the loan ocer (27.3%) and the credit committee (7.4%) tend to reinforce it. Understandably, the MFI's contribution to the gender gap is lower for known applicants (25.9%) than for newcomers (53.5%). More interestingly, this dierence is almost entirely explained by the loan ocers' attitude changes.
Indeed, the ocers' share of responsibility in the gender gap drops from 43.5%
for newcomers to 18.1% for known applicants. This result conrms that the relationship is mainly experienced by the loan ocers who are in charge of the eld work, and hence establish personal contacts with the borrowers. The credit committee is less sensitive to existing relationships, and tends to stick to its prior (but light) bias against female applicants.
As robustness checks, we rerun the regressions on subsamples along two dimensions, successively. Firstly, we segment the full sample by loan ocer. It appears that the observed gender-gap emanates from an identiable subgroup of eleven loan ocers out of 40.
13 The bias intensity is thus heterogeneously distributed among loan ocers (Méon and Szafarz, 2011) .
12 Known clients have already reimbursed one loan at least.
13 Notably, the ocer's gender does not explain the gender gap in proposed amounts.
Secondly, we split the sample period in eleven one-year sub-periods. The oneyear regressions show that the share of ocers' responsibility for the gender gap decreases with time, evolving from 38% in 1997 to 7% in 2007. Hence, the size of the objective gender gap that remained stable in absolute terms over the whole period increased proportionately to the size of the subjective gender gap. This could signal that some favorable kind of learning and/or adjustment process has taken place with time in VivaCred.
Summing up, the gender gap in loan size that originates from the MFI is mainly attributable to its loan ocers. However, the credit committee tends to marginally contribute to this unfair gender gap. Therefore, each step of the loan granting process is detrimental to female applicants.
On average, women apply for smaller loans than men. This initial selfchosen handicap is reinforced, rather than corrected, by the loan ocers who fail to properly account for the objective characteristics collected during the screening process. On top of that, the credit committee fails to monitor the ocers eciently since it does not counterbalance for the loan ocers' misjudgment.
Concluding Remarks
The peculiarities of its lending methodology exposes the micronance sector to a severe principal-agent problem. In practice, this translates into an unchallenged dominance of the loan ocers in the decision making.
Most
MFIs try to align the loan ocers' objectives to their own mission through wage incentives.
15 However, even when incentives are enforced (as in VivaCred), monitoring remains an indispensable complement, especially given the persistence of a huge excess demand for microloans.
This paper has shown that monitoring is working poorly, at least for correcting the credit ocers' gender-biased recommendations. As a consequence, 14 As stated by Microsave (http://www.microsave.org/toolkit/individual-lending-forcredit-ocers-toolkit): At most institutions, Credit Ocers must be everything and do everything. They must take a client through the lending process, from the rst introduction to the MFI and products to full repayment of the loan. In some institutions, they underwrite several dierent types of loans, as well as sell many dierent types of bank products. The Credit Ocer is expected to be in the eld 80% of the time and cover as many potential borrowers as possible.
15 According to McKim and Hughart (2005) , the share of MFIs that use sta incentive schemes grew from 6% in 1990 to 63% in 2003 . de Janvry, McIntosh and Sadoulet (2010 and Labie et al. (2010) discuss the merits of incentive-based wage schemes for non-prot MFIs.
other measures are needed to discourage loan ocers from expressing their subjective and economically unjustied preferences and/or stereotypes when making proposals to the credit committee.
Given the importance of subsidies in micronance, donors could constitute a valuable channel of inuence to reach fairer loan allocation. Regulations and/or codes of good conduct could also help disciplining the loan ocers, provided that such rules are accompanied by appropriate enforcement mechanisms.
Inescapably, monitoring increases operational costs, which are knowingly high in the micronance industry. Therefore, other disciplining devices could be advocated. For instance, MFIs could put in place well-designed hiring policies. More precisely, loan ocers could be selected among job candidates who exhibit ex ante characteristics that spontaneously align their objectives with the MFI's mission.
16 VivaCred seems to have made progress in this direction since the gender bias of its loan ocers has dampened with time despite the credit committee sticking to its modus operandi.
However, the very nature of spontaneously favorable characteristics for loan ocers remains unclear and, even if these characteristics were identied, nding loan ocers with narrow proles is not warranted. Still, when hiring loan ocers MFIs could at least pay attention to the candidates' propensity of making biased recommendations. The resulting condence in its loan ocers' probity could indeed be fruitful to the MFI in terms of monitoring cost reduction.
In fact, the main diculty in assessing the actual biases in loan granting stems from data availability. Indeed, detailed databases such as the one used in this paper are rarely disclosed, so that the internal functioning of MFIs keeps looking like a black box to the researchers, and likely to the managers of the MFIs themselves.
In that respect, it is fair emphasizing that VivaCred is a well-managed -and exceptionally transparent -MFI that benets from a well-organized recording system. Therefore, we conjecture that the evidence put forward in this paper underestimates the agency problem prevailing in the overall micronance industry. Of course, more data are required to assess the validity of this
conjecture.
An important limitation of this paper comes from its restriction to the gender bias. Indeed, other judgmental biases may lead to loan ocers' recommendations diverging from the MFI's mission statement and nancial sustainability.
16 For instance, D'Espallier, Guérin and Mersland (2011) show that female credit ocers increase the odds of serving women.
biases like cultural anity, racial prejudice, etc.
In conclusion, our contribution conrms that the governance of sociallyoriented rms raises specic issues (Labie, 2001; Hartarska, 2005; Mersland and Strom, 2010) . By scrutinizing the inuence of microcredit ocers in the decision-making process, this paper has stressed the need for innovative disciplining devices designed to eciently combat detrimental and mostly involuntary mission drift resulting from biased loan ocers.
